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ABSTRACT. Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) has received strong support as a major
component of future global climate change policy. The financial mechanism of REDD+ is payment for the ecosystem service
of carbon sequestration in tropical forests that is expected to create incentives for conservation of forest cover and condition.
However, the costs of achieving emissions reduction by these means remain largely unknown. We assess the set-up,
implementation, and monitoring costs, i.e., collectively the transaction costs, of six of the first seven REDD+ project designs
from the Peruvian Amazon and compare them with established projects in Brazil and Bolivia. The estimated costs vary greatly
among the assessed projects from US$0.16 to 1.44 ha-1 yr-1, with an average of US$0.73 ha-1 yr-1, though they are comparable
to earlier published estimates. The results indicate that the costs of implementing REDD+ are highly uncertain for participating
developing countries because of issues such as inadequate project design and how additionality is determined. Furthermore,
some insight is obtained into how different activities to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the type of implementer,
and project location affect implementation costs of REDD+ projects. Even with these first estimates, the cost of preserving
existing intact forests in the Peruvian Amazon may have been underestimated.
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INTRODUCTION
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+) is an international program for
protecting and enhancing the carbon stocks of tropical forest
regions and reducing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases (Angelsen et al. 2009, UNFCCC 2011). Initially adopted
at the 13th Conference of Parties (COP) of the United Nations
Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
2007 (Thompson et al. 2011), and further developed at the
UNFCCC COP16 in Cancun, Mexico in 2010 (UNFCCC
2011), the rationale of REDD+ is to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by incentivizing a net reduction in tropical
deforestation and forest degradation. The measures can
include conservation, sustainable management, and the
enhancement of the carbon stocks of existing forests to provide
positive incentives in countries where forests are better
protected, as well as those where deforestation and forest
degradation rates are high (Thompson et al. 2011). It is
intended that REDD+ activities align with ongoing efforts to
improve forest management, and to ensure the achievement
of cobenefits such as poverty alleviation, watershed
protection, and biodiversity conservation.  
One of the key debates surrounding the development of
REDD+ relates to the costs of implementing policies and
actions to achieve these aims; cost estimates are particularly
important for tropical forest countries to inform decisions on
how and where to establish projects. Opportunity costs, i.e.,
the potential benefits of alternative land uses that have to be
forsaken when forest is conserved, are generally considered
to be the largest cost component of REDD+ and they are used
in global and regional estimates of REDD+ costs. Kindermann
et al. (2008) estimate that the global opportunity cost of
reducing deforestation rates by 50% in Latin America by 2030
would be US$10-25/tCO2 and that of a 10% reduction would
be US$1.5-8/tCO2. These global estimates are based on the
opportunity costs of large-scale, commercial agriculture such
as soy bean cultivation. Opportunity costs of small-scale,
subsistence agriculture are often much smaller: Grieg-Gran
(2006) found that in eight tropical countries farming income
equates to less than US$1/tCO2 where land has been recently
converted from forest, and is usually well below US$5/tCO2.
This is similar to estimates of Potvin et al. (2008) who
calculated opportunity costs of US$1.11/tCO2e for small-scale
cattle ranching in Panama.  
Although opportunity costs are critical in the assessment of
REDD+ and other conservation projects, they are only a part
of the story. The set-up, implementation, and monitoring costs
of REDD+ projects may also form a significant portion of total
project costs (Sommerville et al. 2009, 2011, Baker et al.
2010). For example, in remoter areas the opportunity costs of
forest conversion may be smaller than the transaction and
implementation costs (White and Minang 2011), and in the
case of (de jure) free-access forests, opportunity costs may
approach zero because conserving these forests may only
involve the costs of modifying current patterns of forest use
(Pagiola and Bosquet 2009). Even where opportunity costs are
significant, the costs of establishing, implementing, and
monitoring may make an important contribution to total
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Table 1. Definition of cost categories of REDD+ projects in this study.
 
Cost Categories Definition Inclusion
Opportunity costs Costs resulting from the forgone benefits that deforestation
would have generated for livelihoods and the national economy.
Not included.
Set-up costs Costs necessary for the implementers to establish or start a
REDD+ project, taking it from design to implementation.
Information search and design (e.g., carbon stocks,
deforestation modeling, socioeconomic characteristics),
negotiation, certification, capacity-building,
procurement, etc.
Implementation costs Costs directly associated with the actions leading to reduced
deforestation or forest degradation, and hence to reduced
emissions.
Fire management programs, patrolling, administrative
costs, promoting alternative sustainable livelihoods,
sustainable forestry management, community
development, etc.
Monitoring costs Costs necessary for the implementers of a REDD+ project to
determine if a certain amount of emissions reduction has been
achieved; as well as other cobenefits.
All activities involved in monitoring carbon stocks,
deforestation and forest degradation, and environmental
and social cobenefits.
project costs, thus influencing the likely success of the project
and its ability to invest significantly in social or biodiversity
cobenefits. 
There have been a number of attempts to evaluate the
implementation costs of REDD+ projects. Boucher (2008)
estimated the sum of the average implementation,
administration, and transaction costs from three different
REDD+ projects to be US$1/tCO2 (range US$0.01 - 1.23/
tCO2), and Börner and Wunder (2008) estimated a comparable
cost range of US$0.08 - 0.30/tCO2 for the state of Mato Grosso,
Brazil. However, data remain extremely sparse given the large
number of emerging REDD+ projects in tropical forest
regions. Implementation costs are likely to vary with the scale
and scope of agreed contracts, the nature of participating
entities, carbon pools covered, activities adopted for reducing
deforestation and/or forest degradation, and monitoring
methods employed (GFC and CEESP 2008) but current data
do not allow even a preliminary evaluation of these issues.
Indeed, the literature does not even have a consistent
unambiguous method for defining and classifying forest and
carbon project costs (Cacho et al. 2003). For example, some
authors consider set-up, implementation, and monitoring costs
as only one part of administration or transaction costs (Cacho
et al. 2005, Grieg-Gran 2006, Cacho and Lipper 2007, Börner
and Wunder 2008), whereas others such as Angelsen (2008)
and Viana et al. (2009) consider contract negotiation expenses
to be the sole transaction costs. 
We examined the costs associated with the establishment of
six REDD+ projects in the Peruvian Amazon being operated
under voluntary standards. Voluntary local projects are
pioneers in REDD+ implementation that will inform future
compliance programs. In this light, our analysis of six Peruvian
REDD+ pilot projects aims to contribute to a better
understanding of the cost of local forest-based initiatives for
emissions reduction and REDD+. We examine the project set-
up, implementation and monitoring costs of the Peruvian
projects and compare them with the established REDD+
projects of Juma in Brazil and Noel Kempff in Bolivia. Peru
is a particularly important place to study these initiatives
because it has a large area of forest potentially eligible under
REDD+ schemes: Peru has the second largest area (9 % or
667,244 km²) of the Amazon, with 90% of its original forest
cover remaining (UNEP and ACTO 2009). However,
economic activities and development plans such as the
Interoceanic highway in Madre de Dios (ACA and ACCA
2008), gold mining (Mosquera et al. 2009), oil and gas
exploration (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010), agriculture, and
timber extraction threaten Peru’s historically low
deforestation rate (UNEP and ACTO 2009, Verweij et al.
2009). As a result, in recent years the Peruvian government
has established and extended protected areas and indigenous
territories in the Peruvian Amazon (Anke et al. 2008). In
addition, more than 12 REDD+ projects have been proposed
by different NGOs and commercial organizations (Hajek et
al. 2011).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
For the purposes of this study, we define set-up costs to include
primarily the costs of obtaining information, procurement,
scheme design, negotiation, and certifying emission
reductions (Table 1). Implementation costs arise from
activities reducing deforestation or forest degradation such as
enforcement and forest protection, which aim to ensure
additionality, and administrative costs associated with them.
Finally, monitoring costs include the costs of monitoring
carbon stocks, deforestation and forest degradation, and
cobenefits, to assess conditionality. These three costs, i.e., set-
up, implementation, and monitoring, will hereafter be jointly
referred to as transaction costs. The cost categories used here
are adapted from Pagiola and Bosquet (2009) and White and
Minang (2011). The cost data only include costs incurred or
planned by project developers or investors, not those incurred
by third parties such as the government. We acknowledge that
validation and verification costs depend on the project area,
location, distribution of locations meriting a field visit, and
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also on any discounts provided for bundled projects (Jorge
Torres, Bosques Amazónicos, personal communication). Our
data are derived from the most relevant sources for this region.
Thus, the cost we use for validating the projects with an
international standard, Climate, Community and Biodiversity
Standard (CCB) or the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), is
US$32,400, based on the average of the Tambopata National
Reserve and Bahuaja Sonene National Park (TBNP) project’s
existing estimate (US$35,000) and those of two other Peruvian
projects (US$33,000 and US$29,200, respectively) not
included in this study (Jorge Torres, Bosques Amazónicos,
personal communication). Furthermore, the cost of modeling
future deforestation for TBNP, necessary for project design,
was estimated by the expert who carried out the deforestation
model for the region of Madre de Dios where TBNP is located
(Lucio Pedroni, Carbon Decisions, personal communication);
this is the only company performing this kind of modeling
service in Peru. 
We analyzed a mix of primary and secondary materials,
including quantitative data from project developers’ budgets,
qualitative interviews with them, and project documents. The
six projects examined (Fig. 1) were the only pilot REDD+
projects in Peru at the time, except for one project, which
declined to participate in our study. The material was collected
during April - July 2009 and updated during August -
November 2011. Project developers were identified through
contacts and web searches, and included five NGOs and one
private company. Project costs, incurred and planned (~ 50%
of data is incurred costs and the rest planned), were queried
with a contact person from each project and the initial request
was followed by e-mail exchanges and meetings to clarify,
complete, and verify the data and to understand the
background of each project. 
The six Peruvian pilot projects are being developed in a wide
range of different land use designations: protected areas,
indigenous lands, forestry concessions, and conservation
concessions. We compared the costs of these projects with
those of two established Amazonian REDD+ projects: the
Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia and Juma
Sustainable Development Reserve RED Project in Brazil
(Table 2). 
The cost data of the six Peruvian projects were available for
different time periods, ranging from two to seven years, so it
was necessary to standardize them to a common period. We
selected a 20-year period because four out of the six Peruvian
projects have a 20-year timeline and it facilitated comparison
with the longer term projects of Noel Kempff and Juma. We
calculated average annual set-up, implementation, and
monitoring costs and their sum as transaction costs in US$ per
hectare over the 20-year period. When calculating the net
present value (NPV) of transaction costs, we used the discount
rates of 3.8% (Central Bank of Peru’s annualized interest rate
for December 2010), 5%, and 10% to maintain comparability
with similar studies (Pinedo-Vasquez et al. 1992, Ferraro
2002, van Kooten et al. 2004, Nepstad et al. 2007, Potvin et
al. 2008, Viana et al. 2009) and following recommendations
in the literature for South American countries (Howard et al.
1996, Rondon et al. 2010).
Fig. 1. Location of the six Peruvian REDD+ pilot projects.
Tambopata National Reserve and Bahuaja Sonene National
Park (TBNP); Sustainable Forest Management in Native
Communities (SFM-NC); Cordillera Azul National Park
(CANP); Alto Huayabamba Conservation Concession
(AHCC); Los Amigos Conservation Concession (LACC);
Sustainable Forest Management in Forestry Concessions
(SFM-FC). Map provided by R. M. Roman.
To facilitate comparisons between projects, we calculated
costs on a per hectare basis. In addition, to provide values
comparable with estimates of opportunity costs, we calculated
the cost of reducing 1 tCO2 emissions for the two Peruvian
projects with the most complete data on costs and estimated
emission reductions (TBNP and SFM-FC; acronyms
explained in Fig. 1), and compared them with the Juma and
the Noel Kempff projects. These calculations show which of
these projects is most cost-effective at reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation.
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RESULTS
The 20-year REDD+ project budgets vary from US$0.16 to
1.44 ha-1 yr-1, with an average of US$0.73 ha-1 yr-1, when they
are expressed as average transaction costs per project forest
area. There was no evidence of a general negative correlation
between these costs and total project area. However, in line
with economies-of-scale reasoning, one of the projects with a
small forest area, SFM-NC, was the most costly (Fig. 2).
LACC and AHCC, which also had below-average forest area,
had the lowest cost per hectare but this could be because of
incomplete data owing to ongoing project development. The
SFM-FC and Juma projects may also be underestimating their
project costs, as has been observed by other authors for pilot
REDD+ projects (e.g., Chenost et al. 2009). The intermediate-
level costs of the TBNP project are comparable with those of
the similarly sized Noel Kempff project.
Fig. 2. Average transaction costs of the six Peruvian
projects (discounted at 3.8%), the Brazilian and Bolivian
REDD+ projects in relation to project area (diamonds =
protected areas; triangles = conservation concessions; circle
= forestry concession; square = indigenous land). Project
acronyms are defined in Figure 1.
On average about 10% of the total transaction costs were due
to set-up (Standard Error [SE] = 3.07), 20% due to monitoring
(SE = 7.52), and 70% due to implementation (SE = 7.54; Table
3). There were no systematic differences between the six
Peruvian projects and the two established projects in Bolivia
and Brazil, though the mean set-up cost of the Peruvian
projects was lower. Monitoring costs of the Peruvian projects
ranged widely from 0 to 66%; however for three of the projects
(TBNP, CANP, and AHCC) they ranged between 14 and 25%,
which is within the range of the established Bolivian and
Brazilian projects. TBNP and AHCC were the only two
projects to include forest carbon, deforestation, social and
environmental monitoring. In all the Peruvian projects except
for SFM-FC, over 70% of the costs were due to
implementation. Although implementation planning was still
underway in the Peruvian projects, some observations can be
made about implementation costs. One of the smallest
projects, SFM-NC, had the highest projected average annual
implementation cost, US$1.26 per hectare. The TBNP and the
Noel Kempff projects had a similar intermediate size and were
also closely matched in implementation cost. 
Four of the Peruvian projects included planned monitoring
costs in their budget. We compare them in Figure 3 with
published costs of eight different monitoring methods and
technologies. The costs reported by all four projects were in
the middle of the range of the methods/technologies (higher
than four and lower than the other four). These costs are likely
to increase, depending on whether only deforestation is
monitored, or both deforestation and degradation.
Fig. 3. Average monitoring costs per hectare per year for
four Peruvian REDD+ projects (black) and eight commonly
used monitoring methods/technologies (grey): OMRS =
Optical Medium Resolution Sensor, Landsat-5, TM; NFMA
= National Forest Monitoring and Assessment for five
countries; OHRS = Optical High Resolution Sensor,
Quickbird; GBI (B) = Ground-based inventories, Noel
Kempff, Bolivia; OVHRS = Optical Very High Resolution
Sensor, Quickbird and Worldview-1; Indonesia (A) =
Airborne monitoring, Ulu Masen Project, Indonesia; LiDAR
= airborne Light Detection and Ranging, Indonesia (data
from Böttcher et al. 2009 in which the primary source
references are cited).
DISCUSSION
Our estimate of the average transaction cost of the six Peruvian
REDD+ projects (US$0.73 ha-1 yr-1; SE = 0.18) is somewhat
lower than previously published costs. For example, Grieg-
Gran (2006) estimated the annual administration costs for
REDD+ in eight tropical countries to be between US$4 and
15 per hectare, and Börner and Wunder (2008) estimated
annual implementation costs of US$4.5 per hectare for
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon. Slightly closer to
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Table 3. Summary of estimated costs for the six Peruvian projects and the actual costs of two established projects in Bolivia
and Brazil, including: set up, implementation, and monitoring costs annually per hectare and as a percentage of the total; projects’
total annual transaction cost per hectare at 3.8%, 5%, and 10% discount rate; total annual transaction cost in US$; and estimated
cost of reducing 1 tCO2 emissions for two projects in Peru compared with the two established projects in Bolivia and Brazil.
Note that all values are reported as average net present value discounted at 3.8% (unless otherwise stated). The data for the
Bolivian and Brazilian projects was obtained from Brown et al. 2000, Asquith et al. 2002, FAS 2008, and Brown 2005. Project
acronyms are defined in Figure 1.
 
Project
Cost component TBNP CANP AHCC LACC SFM-NC
SFM-FC
Peruvian
Project
Mean (%)
Noel
Kempff
Juma
Set-up costs
(US$ ha-1yr-1 [%])
0.06
(4)
0.04
(5)
0.04
(5)
0.06
(28)
0.18
(9)
0.08 
(11)
0.08
(10)
0.21
(18)
0.11
(20)
Implementation costs
(US$ ha-1yr-1 [%])
0.79 
(81)
0.43
(70)
0.49
(81)
0.11
(72)
1.26 
(91)
0.12 
(23)
0.53
(70)
0.64
(72)
0.22
(52)
Monitoring costs
(US$ ha-1yr-1 [%])
0.15
(15)
0.15
(25)
0.08
(14)
0 
(0)
0
(0)
0.35 
(66)
0.12
(20)
0.09
(10)
0.12
(28)
Total transaction
cost (US$ ha-1yr-1)
At 3.8% discount rate 1.00 0.63 0.61 0.16 1.44 0.55 0.73 0.94 0.46
At 5% discount rate 0.90 0.57 0.55 0.15 1.31 0.50 0.66 0.86 0.41
At 10% discount rate 0.62 0.40 0.38 0.11 0.94 0.36 0.46 0.63 0.29
Annual transaction cost (US$) 549,068 851,719 87,865 24,031 199,269 54,252 294,367 603,186 149,975
Cost per emissions reduction (US$/1 tCO2) 1.36 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.06 0.71 5.25 0.40
our estimates are those of the PROFAFOR Ecuadorian
reforestation and afforestation project that had annual per
hectare costs of US$3 (Wunder and Alban 2008), as did the
Costa Rican national payment for ecosystem services scheme
(Grieg-Gran 2006). In contrast, if we look at one category of
costs of the Peruvian projects, the implementation costs
(US$0.11 – 1.26), these are in the range found by Bruner et
al. (2004) for actual average annual expenditure for terrestrial
protected areas (US$0.05 - 3.00). However, these costs are
clearly below what Oestreicher et al. (2009) considered the
ideal funding (US$7.09) to accomplish the management plan
objectives in protected areas in Panama.  
A variety of factors might contribute to the low costs that we
report here compared with other published values. First, some
of our costs are initial estimates rather than the actual costs
incurred by the project developer, and such costs may prove
to be an underestimate. However, although planned costs may
not be as accurate as incurred costs, they are still important
for examining REDD+ developers’ intervention strategies.
Furthermore, care was taken to ensure that any estimates used
in this study were based on locally relevant values.
Monitoring costs: what and how
Second, patchy inclusion of monitoring costs in project
budgets suggests that project developers may not be fully
aware of the efforts and expenditure needed to monitor carbon
stocks, reduction of emissions, and cobenefits in a REDD+
project. Monitoring costs will depend on the desired level of
accuracy, which may vary by the type of project activity and
thus on the technology selected, whether only deforestation is
monitored, or deforestation and degradation (the latter is much
more challenging and potentially costly), the size of the project
area, e.g., per hectare costs of LiDAR coverage may be
significantly reduced if a large area is to be surveyed (Asner
2009), whether the project area is contiguous or dispersed
among small landowners, the natural variation within the
various carbon pools, and the terrain of the landscape (IPCC
2000, Böttcher et al. 2009). In particular, in these case studies,
project developers did not consider cost differences between
monitoring only deforestation, or deforestation and
degradation; to monitor forest degradation it is necessary to
combine high resolution satellite imagery with ground
monitoring (Böttcher et al. 2009, Corbera et al. 2010) though
airborne LiDAR offers considerable potential to improve the
efficiency once its costs have reduced sufficiently (Asner
2009). Furthermore, some of the variability in costs between
different projects may be related to their size; monitoring costs
are likely to represent a smaller percentage of total costs in
larger projects (Mooney et al. 2004). This is true even when
monitoring includes social and environmental cobenefits, and
not just carbon stocks, deforestation, and forest degradation. 
Third, although social and environmental cobenefits feature
prominently in the policy surrounding REDD+ and are
considered to be criteria for project approval, the huge
challenges in their implementation and monitoring do not
seem to have been considered fully in the design of the projects
assessed in this study. For example, at the time of data
collection most of the Peruvian project developers were unsure
of what compensation, if any, would be given to local
inhabitants. This is evidence of the high risk that these projects
Ecology and Society 18(1): 17
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss1/art17/
are underestimating or overlooking the costs of ensuring social
and environmental cobenefits. Again, this may mean that costs
will rise as these REDD+ projects develop.
Implementation costs: reducing deforestation and forest
degradation
In addition to the generally low costs in Peru that we find in
this study, there is also considerable variability between the
projects. This variability may be related to the characteristics
of the projects themselves such as differences in
implementation activity portfolios, as well as the history of
project areas and affected human population size. Our data
provide some evidence of the planned activities and factors
that might be most influential in determining implementation
costs. For example, the SFM-FC project managed by private
logging companies had the second lowest implementation
costs and the smallest affected population size. This project
planned to enforce existing best practice in forestry, as well
as adding patrolling and border definition. Likewise, at the
time of the study, the LACC project, which had the lowest
implement costs, did not consider any activities involving
local inhabitants. Furthermore, of the REDD+ projects
considered, SFM-FC and LACC are in the most remote
locations where there are likely to be less intense pressures of
deforestation and forest degradation. On the other hand, the
TBNP project, with the second highest implementation costs,
had a higher affected population size and a more varied
portfolio of activities promoting sustainable alternative
livelihoods, patrolling, building and maintaining infrastructure,
and fire management. The SFM-NC project, with the highest
implementation costs, also involved community-based
activities for sustainable forestry management. Thus, there
seems to be a link between low project implementation costs
and a lack of activities aimed at local sustainability and
location in more remote areas. In addition, further research is
needed to examine if private company-based and NGO-based
REDD+ projects are, in general, less costly per hectare than
community-based projects. 
The ratio of implementation costs to emissions reduction
potential is a measure of the ‘cost-effectiveness’ of REDD+
projects (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009). This ratio can also be
used to compare estimates of the opportunity costs of similar
projects and to judge the importance of implementation costs
for achieving project aims. Our results suggest that the ratio
of implementation costs to emissions reduction potential is
generally low: for the two Peruvian projects with definite
estimates of future emission reductions and the established
projects in Bolivia and Brazil, the calculated implementation
costs per tCO2 emissions reduction range from US$0.06 to
5.25, with a mean of US$1.77 (Table 3). These values are
within the range of estimates of opportunity costs from other
Amazonian studies, but at the lower end. For example, Vera
Diaz and Schwartzman (2005) calculated that logging and
cattle ranching benefits in Brazil translate to about US$3/tCO2 
where there is high timber potential and to about US$0.8/tCO2 
where timber potential is low. Nepstad et al. (2007) found an
average opportunity cost of US$1.6/tCO2e for the Brazilian
Amazon. Börner and Wunder (2008) found that opportunity
costs vary across and within states in Brazil, from US$3/tCO2 
in Amazonas and up to US$12/tCO2 in Mato Grosso, and
Armas et al. (2009) found that the opportunity cost for the
Peruvian Amazon varied among provinces, from US$0.6/ha
in San Martin up to US$67/ha in Amazonas, with an average
opportunity cost of US$4.4/ha. These values suggest that
opportunity costs are likely to exceed transaction costs, which
are dominated by implementation costs, for the majority of
projects. 
Uncertainty in per-hectare costs is compounded in estimates
of the ratio of implementation costs to expected emissions
reductions, by uncertainty in estimates of current carbon
stocks and deforestation threat. For example, the much lower
estimated cost of reducing 1 tCO2 emissions by the SFM-FC
project, US$0.06/tCO2, is attributable to its very optimistic
predictions of total emission reductions (annual average of
847,382 tCO2e emission reductions). In general, the
experience of the Noel Kempff project, where estimates of
carbon emissions reductions have periodically been revised
downward (Densham et al. 2009), suggests that these values
may fall, and therefore cause a rise in the ratio of
implementation costs to emissions reductions as projects
develop. Together with the expected rise in both
implementation and monitoring costs beyond the planned
estimates, as projects are implemented, lower achieved
emissions reductions than initial overly optimistic estimates
are likely to contribute to a large increase in the actual cost of
projects per emissions reduction achieved.
Cost of reducing deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon
Although the costs presented here are uncertain and may be
revised upward as projects are implemented, these values
provide some of the first data that can be used to estimate the
potential cost of implementing an effective REDD+ scheme
in the Peruvian Amazon. For comparison, the Peruvian
Ministry of the Environment has stated that Peru would need
US$25 million per annum over the next decade to halt
deforestation of the 54 million ha of the country’s intact natural
forest, based on the protection of 32% of this area in national
parks, 22% in indigenous lands, 39% in sustainable forestry
areas, and 7% in eco-tourism areas (Painter 2008). The pilot
REDD+ projects we examined encompass a similar range of
land use designations, i.e., protected areas, indigenous land,
forestry concessions, and conservation concessions.
Multiplying the project implementation costs (these costs are
used because they are the costs of specific activities necessary
to achieve reduction of deforestation and forest degradation)
estimated in this study by the total area of forest to be protected
in the Peruvian Amazon to achieve the Ministry of the
Environment’s target suggests that its program would cost
US$29 million per annum based on the mean implementation
cost of US$0.53/ha of all six projects. The estimated total cost
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varies from only US$6 million per annum using the lowest
implementation cost of US$0.11/ha of the LACC project, to
US$68 million per annum if the highest implementation cost
of US$1.26/ha of the SFM-NC project is used. Therefore, the
Peruvian Ministry of the Environment’s cost estimate is
similar to, but slightly below, the average for the six projects
reported in this study and 65% lower than our higher bound
estimate. 
Comparing the Ministry of the Environment’s estimate of the
cost of halting deforestation with the wider literature, it falls
within the very broad management cost range for protected
areas in high wilderness (US$0.54 - 32.4 million per year)
calculated from per-hectare cost estimates reported by
Balmford et al. (2003). However, it is well below the range of
US$70.2 - 2700 million per year calculated from the per-
hectare management cost range for protected areas in densely
settled regions by Balmford et al. (2003), which could be more
relevant to Peru because of its wide range of forest-use types
and deforestation drivers. The estimates of Bruner et al. (2004)
also give a range of management costs (US$48.6 - 486 million)
that are much higher than the Peruvian Ministry’s estimates.
As noted above, through comparison with values from the
literature we consider that there is a high risk that the estimated
project costs reported in the present study will be
underestimates of the actual project implementation costs.  
A further reason for considering the cost estimates of the
present study as an underestimation across the whole of the
Peruvian Amazon is that they are based on public lands, except
for the SFM-NC project on indigenous land, and are subject
to existing formal legal obligations for conservation or
sustainable management. Additional transaction costs
required to prevent deforestation and forest degradation are
likely to be higher in nonprotected areas. The issue is whether
the existing legal designation of these lands is an absolute
barrier to demonstrating additionality, or whether a project
designed to increase the effectiveness of the existing level of
achievement of de jure forest protection could qualify (Healey
et al. 2000, Pistorius et al. 2010). Indigenous land could benefit
from further incentives to reduce deforestation and forest
degradation, which the government seems to be pursuing
already through a policy to compensate indigenous people (see
Pagarán a indígenas por la conservación ... 2009). However,
further incentivizing those entities already voluntarily
managing public sites, i.e., protected areas and concessions,
may not be economically gainful for a country. On the other
hand, evidence shows that tropical countries’ efforts to tackle
deforestation and forest degradation through designation of
conservation areas and promotion of sustainable forest
management are not always effective (e.g., Adams et al. 2004,
Htun et al. 2010). Frequently this is because forests have been
used as open-access resources by local communities and other
groups (Börner and Wunder 2008), as seen in national parks
and indigenous and extractive reserves in Peru. Therefore, we
suggest that our upper-bound estimate of US$68 million per
year to halt deforestation is likely to be closest to representing
the actual costs of protecting the forests of the Peruvian
Amazon because this estimate corresponds with the lower
bounds of relevant management cost ranges reported by
Balmford et al. (2003) and Bruner et al. (2004).  
To a government, as well as to other actors who are involved
in developing REDD+ projects, the cost of reducing
deforestation or forest degradation may appear to consist only
of the cost of changing the open access status of a forest area.
However, the opportunity costs borne by local people cannot
be ignored; in many situations they have been using the forests
as an important part of their livelihoods and have to forgo this
use when forest management changes as a result of the
implementation of a REDD+ project. Both formal legal status
and reality have to be taken into account before a payment for
ecosystem services scheme, such as REDD+, can be
implemented on a larger scale (Börner et al. 2010). In the
context of the Peruvian Amazon, as in most of Latin America,
the situation is one in which informal rights are often asserted
over any legalized property rights. Legal frameworks would
seem to be of little significance, as observed with expanding
illegal artisanal gold mining by Swenson et al. (2011). This is
probably also the case with other high-priced global
commodities present in Peru such as oil, gas, and coca. In
addition to the arguments above, conflict over tenure and
uncertainty of compensation will further increase the costs of
conserving the remaining Peruvian Amazon forests,
suggesting to us that the overall actual costs are likely to be
closer to our upper estimates (US$68 million per year) than
the US$25 million per year estimate of the Peruvian
government.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on transaction costs of US$0.16 to 1.44 ha-1 yr-1,
(average US$0.73 ha-1 yr-1), our results suggest that the cost
of implementing REDD+ in the Peruvian Amazon may be on
the order of US$68 million per annum. However, our estimates
based on existing pilot projects are uncertain and likely to rise
as, for example, the actual cost of achieving and monitoring
emissions reduction through reduced deforestation and forest
degradation, together with the required cobenefits, becomes
known. Our results illustrate how these costs vary substantially
from project to project and are quite uncertain. There is also
a significant risk of actual costs being underestimated by
governments and project developers because of inadequate
project design, e.g., for implementation and monitoring
activities, and how additionality is defined, e.g., estimation of
expected emission reductions, with potentially significant
negative consequences for the sustainability and viability of
implemented projects. Importantly, implementation costs to
reduce deforestation and forest degradation seem to be mainly
influenced by the presence of activities aimed at local
sustainability, remoteness of projects, and the type of
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institution implementing the project. However, more research
is needed on the relationship between project costs and specific
interventions to reduce deforestation and forest degradation.
However, even with these first estimates, the cost of preserving
existing intact forests in the Peruvian Amazon may have been
underestimated.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5239
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